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THESIS

**THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND
ANALYSIS CENTER: A MODEL FOR STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS ROLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY**

by

Charles D. English

June 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Maria Rasmussen
Robert Simeral

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**THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER: A
MODEL FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ROLE IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

Charles D. English
Director of Operations, Georgia Emergency Management Agency
B.S., Georgia State University, 1986

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2004**

Author: Charles D. English

Approved by: Maria Rasmussen
Thesis Advisor

Robert Simeral
Second Reader

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Since 9/11 there have been many demands for robust intelligence efforts and information sharing in the context of Homeland Security. This thesis focuses on the critical need for the inclusion of local and state intelligence collection efforts into the broader intelligence community and describes a model for states to follow when creating a statewide Information Sharing and Analysis Center. Key organizational and relationship principles are examined. Establishing state ISACs and including them as partners in fight against terrorism benefits all levels of government at the strategic and tactical intelligence levels. Requirements for successful state level ISACs are identified through numerous cases studies focusing on the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The events that occurred on September 11, 2001 changed many things about life in America. While terrorists, both domestic and international, had committed acts of terrorism in the United States prior to 9/11; on that day everyone knew that these attacks signified something different. That day there were no doubts to the resolve, creativity and capability of the enemy. Many questioned, at the time, the identity of the enemy but no one questioned the fact that an enemy existed and they were attacking us in our own backyard.

One particular change about life in America since 9/11 is the subject of this thesis, the need for government officials at all levels to have accurate, timely, and exhaustive intelligence information. The intelligence community is the system that collects, develops and analyzes information that can be used to identify and defeat our terrorist enemies. That system must now be repaired. The very system that is not only responsible for developing, collecting, analyzing but also for *sharing* intelligence information, failed on 9/11. One of the reasons for that failure was the virtual exclusion of input from state and local law enforcement into that system. On that tragic day foreign-initiated acts of terrorism occurred in America. Not against American interests in Yemen, Kabul or Beirut but in cities and states in the homeland of the United States of America. The attacks were not state sponsored military offensive maneuvers utilizing military forces and weaponry, but were instead offensive maneuvers by terrorists who were living here, planning here and operating under the radar screen of the established intelligence community. The intelligence community had previously failed with both international and domestic attacks, but since 9/11 solutions are being demanded. This thesis offers a solution.

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is not to try and solve each and every issue or problem that exists within the intelligence community. The purpose of this thesis is to prove is that state and local governments have a key role to play in the system we refer to as the intelligence community. Further, this thesis will show

that not only do state and local governments need information from the intelligence community but the intelligence community desperately needs information from state and local governments. Additionally, this thesis will describe the requirements that are necessary for a successful state level Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) effort. The final point of the thesis is to show the important organizational features of a state ISAC. To describe how the Georgia ISAC (GISAC) was created the successes it has had and through case studies highlight important points, successes and challenges faced by states in their effort to develop ISACs. All in order to give other states a solution and a model to consider when developing state level intelligence capabilities. Today each state needs this capability and the federal intelligence community needs the input of the fifty states. The author's argument is that the current intelligence system has failed and it is necessary for states to develop information collection, sharing and analysis capabilities to do their part in the fight against terrorism. States have a significant role in terrorism prevention in the homeland security context. As Secretary Tom Ridge has stated, "If we secure the hometowns, we will secure the homeland."¹

B. IMPORTANCE

We now know that not only are domestic terrorists living in our communities but international terrorists as well and it is from our own neighborhoods in which they are staging their attacks. Of course, we know the nineteen Al Qaeda hijackers from 9/11 were living in the United States, but do not think that those nineteen were an anomaly or represent some temporary hole in the immigration system. Nor should you think that Al Qaeda is the only international terrorist organization represented in our homeland. Consider the case recently prosecuted in North Carolina where nineteen people, all operatives of Hezbollah, were convicted of money laundering and smuggling money back to the Middle East for support of terrorism. Additionally consider the statement of U.S. Attorney Robert Conrad, "I believe that if there is a Hezbollah terrorist cell in

¹ Don Plummer and Rebecca Carr. "U.S. Still Donning Security Armor". *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*. 12 May 2002.

Charlotte, then there are similar cells elsewhere."² There is ample, actually plentiful, evidence that there are various terrorists (both international and domestic) and those who provide material support to terrorist organizations living in the United States. If the people who seek to destroy us are living among us then we cannot rely solely on some foreign legal attaché or upon some signals intelligence source aimed at a safe-house in a country, of which most of us can not properly pronounce the name, to provide all of our intelligence information. We must consider the abundance and critical nature of the information that is available at the state and local government level. By the way, the information that initiated the investigation into the Hezbollah cell in North Carolina was provided by an alert local Sheriff's deputy. He was off duty one day and noticed a young Middle Eastern man buying large quantities of cigarettes with cash and reported the information to the authorities.

C. A SOLUTION

Not only do state and local governments need to be allowed ingress and egress into the intelligence community. There must be a mechanism to allow for that access. The State of Georgia has created such a mechanism that has proven to be both effective and efficient in accomplishing that mission. In October of 2001 the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) was created as that state's first effort at preventive efforts toward terrorism. There were several goals for GISAC initially; establish a central organization where local governments could deposit pieces of information they thought to be suspicious relating to potential terrorism; create a liaison with the federal government's intelligence community through the FBI and to facilitate the sharing of any pertinent information with local and/or federal agencies as needed.

For many years local, state and even federal law enforcement intelligence efforts have been focused on traditional criminal intelligence activities including organized crime and drug trafficking; international terrorism was something to be handled by the military or the Central Intelligence Agency. For some reason

² Toni Locy. "U.S. Looks at Potential Danger From Hezbollah". *USA Today*. 14 May 2003.

it appeared to be the conventional wisdom that in America, until recently, terrorism was infrequent and unimportant. In fact, in the past half-century, the United States has experienced a significant amount of terrorism.³

Today we are again reminded that terrorists, both international and domestic, are living on American soil and history tells us that America is vulnerable to those terrorists.⁴ Now, with the spotlight of 9/11 on the failure of the intelligence community, we must enlist and include the valuable contributions that state/local governments can provide to the intelligence system.

The GISAC is nearly three years old and has enjoyed tremendous success. The organization has been recognized by the National Governor's Association as part of a state contingent invited to participate in a Policy Academy for Best Practices in Homeland Security in 2002. GISAC has also been involved in many successful and high profile cases and investigations that have contributed to the overall intelligence effort in our country. In addition, the organization is currently breaking new ground by participating as a co lead agency (with the FBI) in the intelligence operations for the upcoming Group of Eight Summit (G8) to be held on Sea Island, Georgia in June 2004.

D. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY

One particular high profile case occurred in September 2002 and is referred to as the Alligator Alley case. That case, summarized in Chapter II, demonstrates several points that will be expanded upon throughout this paper; the importance of local inputs, the necessity of relationships and connectivity with other states and the federal government and the viable role of local governments to deny terrorist plots. That chapter will further describe the requirements of an effective information sharing system that is a necessary addition to every state and to the intelligence community.

³ Christopher Hewitt. *Understanding Terrorism In America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda*. London, Routledge, 2003. p. 12.

⁴ Ibid. Hewitt asserts between 1954 and 9/11 "well over 3000 terrorists incidents...have taken place within the United States and Puerto Rico...and it would be a serious misreading of the historical record to see terrorism as either a new or a trivial phenomenon in America."

There are other requirements beyond the need to develop a system that is able to capture, analyze and pass along the information from the hundreds of thousands of local law enforcement and government officials working in communities every day. It is also important to have a local mechanism to disseminate the strategic intelligence information that is typically developed by the federal government. The State of Georgia does not, and it is doubtful that it ever will, develop operatives in Afghanistan or dispatch interrogators to Guantanamo Bay to gain the type of information that will give an idea of the strategic nature of the enemy. The federal government does, however, and the states must have a mechanism for receiving that information and providing it to state level policy makers. These policy makers need to have strategic intelligence information to make sound resource allocation decisions for their part in the homeland security mission.

Further, states need to be able to collect and disseminate information at the tactical intelligence level. If the collection and analysis system is working properly states can provide valuable pieces of information to the federal government who is in the position to “connect the dots” from a regional or national perspective. Depending on the type of information, states often can take action independently when an impending attack is discovered or if plans are discovered that do not have regional or national implications. Several cases studies in Chapter III highlight examples of the state taking action on information that had a state rather than a national impact.

Chapter III begins with a historical documentation of GISAC and how the unit was established, why it is successful, the challenges that unit is facing and how they are being addressed to ensure its future success. Several case studies of actual events are used to accentuate important principles and show that GISAC is an effective model for states to consider when designing mechanisms for access into the intelligence community.

Equally important this chapter discusses key relationships of GISAC both internal and external to the unit. In the intelligence community, organizational and personal relationships are very important and impact the flow of information.

All “wiring” diagrams, no matter how sophisticated, are deceptive. They portray where agencies sit in relation to one another, but they cannot portray how they interact and which relationships matter and why. Moreover, although we are loath to admit it, personalities do matter. However much we like to think of government as one of laws and institutions, the personalities and relationships of the people filling these important positions also effect agency working relations.⁵

One of the most important relationships for GISAC is the one established with the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) operated out of their Atlanta office. That relationship was formed and eventually GISAC moved into the same building and only one floor separates the two entities. As the unit matured various capabilities and products to support state policy makers were developed and enhanced. Some of these capabilities have their roots in the criminal intelligence realm while some have been developed specifically since 9/11 to fight the war on terror at home.

Chapter III concludes by examining challenges GISAC is facing in light of its success during the past two and one half years. Certain sectors of critical infrastructure are beginning to develop Information Sharing and Analysis Centers of their own. The challenge is to encourage their development for the sharing and analytical capability but to maintain its centrality of all intelligence activities for Georgia. Success has also created high expectations for the unit to maintain. In June 2004, the Group of Eight Summit will be held at Sea Island, Georgia and GISAC will play a key role in this National Security Special Event. GISAC and the other federal partners will staff a fusion center and GISAC will also be taking the lead role in staffing and commanding the field intelligence units.

⁵ Mark Lowenthal. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2nd ed., CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2003. p. 30.

Chapter IV is the concluding chapter and will provide a concise summary of the lessons learned and the evidence supporting the position offered in this thesis. First, the intelligence community has experienced failures in both international and domestic terrorism attacks conducted in America. On 9/11 failures in the intelligence community were amplified. Second, a key solution to repairing the intelligence community is to include state and local intelligence efforts into the broader intelligence community effort. This inclusion into the broader effort benefits both federal and state/local preparedness and prevention efforts. Third, requirements of successful state level information, sharing and analysis capabilities are examined. These requirements are discussed in the context of strategic and tactical level dimensions. Beyond those dimensions, the Alligator Alley case study reveals several fundamental principles that all state level ISACs must incorporate to achieve success. Finally, the state of Georgia has developed an organization that achieves these principles and provides for the intelligence needs of both state and federal levels of governments. GISAC is a model useful for other states to utilize as they develop this capability.

Indeed, the awful events of 9/11 changed many things about life in America. One of the things that changed in Georgia was the way state leaders decided to address their role in the intelligence community and their role in preventing terrorism on a local level. No one knew at the time whether GISAC would succeed or fail or what exactly their mission would be. After deciding that something must be done, the state requirements for successful information sharing and intelligence had to be developed.

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II. REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE INFORMATION SHARING AND INTELLIGENCE ON THE STATE GOVERNMENT LEVEL

It is easy, and today quite fashionable, to condemn the entire intelligence community for the failure to identify the plans and subsequently thwart the terrorist attacks perpetrated by members of Al Qaeda on 9/11. Enough time has passed at this point for all of us to have completed our cycle of emotions (denial, rage, attribution and revenge) and get to the business of solving the problems made manifest by the attacks. It has been widely reported in the media and thoroughly examined by congressional inquiry that while the exact timing, location and method of the attacks were a surprise, the intention that Al Qaeda wanted to further harm United States interests was not a surprise at all to certain members of the intelligence community. The assertion that bits and pieces of information, now known to be significant regarding the attacks, could have been assembled to uncover the plot to kill thousands of Americans may never be fully conclusive.

While the attacks on 9/11 have certainly brought to the forefront the problems within the intelligence community, the United States is no stranger to successful acts of terrorism. The same terrorist organization of 9/11, Al Qaeda, was responsible for the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. More numerous, however, are domestic terrorists who have been successful in conducting many violent and disruptive acts. Timothy McVeigh, committed one of the most deadly terrorists attacks ever in the United States by bombing the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City killing 168. Eric Robert Rudolph, one of the most elusive domestic terrorists, bombed abortion clinics and disrupted the Centennial Olympic Games by detonating a bomb in Centennial Olympic Park killing two and injuring 103 people. These are but a few examples of the numerous acts of terrorism that have been committed in the homeland.

While blame and vindication may be important to some, the important work, I believe, is to examine what went wrong and repair those problems. These constructive actions will be what minimize the chances of a similar “failures” from occurring again.

The task of reengineering the intelligence community is huge and must be tackled by think tanks and task forces vast enough to meet the challenge. There were “intelligence failures” and ultimately the attacks on 9/11 were not prevented. The intelligence community and the system by which intelligence and information is collected, analyzed and shared must be reengineered to incorporate the lessons we have learned. One of those lessons is that state and local governments have a very important role to play and have very high stakes in the success of that system. What this thesis will do is examine but one very narrow component of that reengineering necessity, the role of state and local governments in the intelligence community and the way the State of Georgia has positioned itself to make a contribution to that effort. More specifically, however, this chapter is devoted to outlining the important requirements necessary for effective information sharing and intelligence dissemination to occur at the state and local levels.

The Markle Foundation Task Force Report addressed the organizational challenges necessary to restructure the intelligence community for the effective collection and use of local information.

The first step should be to focus on how information from state and localities, which is so crucial to the homeland security effort, can reach those in the federal government who need to act on it, and how the federal government’s information can reach those on the front line. To be effective at collecting and using all relevant information, the entire national system must work like a network, coordinated at the federal level but controlled locally. Two concrete steps can help start this process. First, states must begin organizing themselves to gather and share information more effectively. Second, the federal government needs one entity responsible for coordinating its role in this effort.⁶

⁶ *Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age: A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force.* October 2002. New York. p. 75.

Regarding antiterrorism intelligence requirements, state and local governments' demands do not differ significantly from those of the federal agencies combating terrorism inside of the United States. Each covets strategic and tactical intelligence, in addition the states need a single point of contact with (or ingress into) the federal system and must have the capability to provide *intelligence* to their policy makers. Here will be discussed the needs and interrelationships necessary for each level of government to meet the requirements for counterterrorism in the homeland, to contribute and benefit from a reengineered system.

A. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE IN THE HOMELAND

The battles of terrorism are being fought both at home and abroad. Naturally, the definitions of strategic and tactical intelligence are somewhat different between local/state, some federal government agencies and military organizations. The line of demarcation is not drawn based upon the level of government that is involved in a particular operation or intelligence product but rather where the battle is being fought, at home or abroad. Mark Lowenthal offers the following goal for the intelligence community regarding strategic surprise, "keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that are capable of threatening the nation's existence."⁷ When a country, through its intelligence community keeps track of these types of elements it precludes strategic surprise. For example, if a country is attacked with a nuclear device when there has been no indication or information that any countries possessed a nuclear device. Conversely, if a country has knowledge of a specific capability possessed by a potential enemy that country can prepare to deny or respond to that specific capability or threat. This type of information and intelligence allows policy makers to make choices with regard to budgetary expenditures, defensive and preparedness activities. In the homeland security context, strategic intelligence is similar and directly supports detection, denial, disruption and preparedness efforts of the entities fighting the battle at home. Since the enemy

⁷ Mark Lowenthal. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2nd ed. CQ Press, Washington. 2003. p. 2.

is living, planning and operating within the boundaries of our country those responsible for fighting them must know what threats and capabilities exist with the enemy.

Starting with the federal budget cycle of 2002 billions of dollars are being spent on state and local preparedness efforts alone. It only makes sense for those state and local first responders to be provided the *strategic intelligence* that will shape their training and preparedness efforts. What is the capability of the enemy? What are the types of attacks that they will plan next? It is senseless to prepare for a method of attack that will never occur but shameful to fail to prepare for an attack that has been predicted. Even more shameful is if the prediction, or capabilities of the enemy, was never shared with those who could prevent it or may have to respond to its consequences. The moral obligation notwithstanding, the fiscal oversight alone should demand that our capacity to prevent and respond is being built based upon accurate information.

To state and local governments the strategic intelligence answers the questions of capability and intent. Would the enemy attack at a sporting event, a mall or a mass transit venue? Or does the enemy prefer to strike the electrical power grid, petroleum transmission pipelines or telecommunications hubs? Is their desire mass casualties, mass disruption, or mass confusion? Once intent and possibly the method of operation is established then the question is can they do it? Does the enemy have the capability to act out their intentions by the methods they choose? What does history tell us, and has this enemy attempted this type of attack before and what were the results? These are the questions and types of information or strategic intelligence that state and local governments need in their preparedness and fight against terrorism. With limited resources and an unlimited number of potential targets and methods of attack, strategic intelligence is a necessary requirement for state and local counterterrorism efforts.

B. TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE HOMELAND

Since the enemy, or least some number of the enemy's operatives are living in the cities and neighborhoods in America, who is best positioned to be the eyes and ears of the Intelligence Community? The answer is the hundreds of thousands of local and state officials that are working in those communities 24 hours a day seven days per week. One can then add to that number the untold number of workers in industries regulated by state and local governments that have regular, mandatory reporting requirements to those authorities. Regardless of whether the *strategic intelligence* indicates that the enemy is desirous of an attack on critical infrastructure, key assets or venues congregating thousands of people in one place, local and state officials have access to those local information sources to report and/or develop the *tactical intelligence*.

Tactical intelligence in the homeland security environment is more specific and when combined with other pieces of information may reveal plans of attack, methods of attack or the location of terrorist cells in a community. With this kind of intelligence reported from countless local and state sources, federal agencies can "connect the dots" on a regional and national level, while state level intelligence organizations can piece together information that may not have as far reaching impacts.

The following case study shows that the specific or tactical level intelligence most often will be reported and developed at the local and state level. The strategic intelligence however was arguably provided by the federal government in the form of a raised threat level and statements by U.S. officials that Al Qaeda operatives were in America subsequent to the attacks of 9/11. Additionally, the case study shows the necessity for a single point of contact for the federal government, a single point of contact for other state resources and why states need capability to conduct their own intelligence operations. The case is known as Alligator Alley and it happened exactly one year after the tragic events of 9/11.

C. ALLIGATOR ALLEY

During the period of September 12-13, 2002 the states of Georgia and Florida became involved in what was to be one of the most highly publicized and highly controversial “terror alerts” that has occurred since the war on terrorism began September 11, 2001.⁸ At 11:10 a.m. on September 12, 2002 a telephone call was forwarded to an agent of the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) by the Calhoun Post of the Georgia State Patrol. The caller was a middle aged nurse, Eunice Stone, who reported to the agent that she and her son, just twenty minutes earlier, had left the Shoney’s restaurant at Interstate 75 and Redbud Road in Calhoun, GA where she overheard the conversation of three “Middle Eastern males” that gave her cause for concern.

⁸ The following account is based on press coverage, including in particular the articles cited.

(Dennis S. Mileti and John H. Sorensen. *Communication of Emergency Public Warnings: A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment*. Prepared for the Federal Emergency Management Agency by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August 1990.

“Eunice Stone’s conversation this morning with Fox News.” *Calhoun Times*, 13 September 2002. Available from http://news.mywebpal.com/news_tool_v2.cfm?pnpid=722&show=archivedetails&ArchiveID=856970&om=1. Accessed 26 April 2003.

“Man in Terror Scare says Woman is Lying.” *CNN.com/U.S.*, 13 September 2002. Available from <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/13/alligator.alley/>. Accessed 3 February 2003.

Chapman, Dan and Mike Williams. “Three Men Stopped in Florida after Woman Reports Threat: Authorities Think Remarks may have just been a Joke”. *ajc.com The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 14 September 2002. Available from <http://www.accessatlanta.com/ajc/news/09/02/14termain.html>. Accessed 3 February 2003.

Goshier, Elijah. “A Greater Threat to U.S. Security: Our Prejudices.” *St. Petersburg Times Online Floridian*, 24 September 2002. Available from http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/24/news_pf/Floridian/A_greater_threat_to_U.shtml. Accessed 3 February 2003

Dahlburg, John-Thor and Stephan Braun. “Florida Is Gripped by Terrorist Scare Tension: Comments Sets off of Massive Police Response.” *Los Angeles Times*, 14 September 2002. Available from <http://www.sidhnet.com/sidhnet/discussion.nsf>. Accessed 2 February 2003.

Green, David and David Kidwell. “Federal Investigators Checking Three Men who reported ‘America would cry on 9/13’.” *Miami Herald*, 13 September 2002. Available from <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/4066947.htm>. Accessed 3 February 2003.

Randall, Kate. “The Florida ‘Terror Attack’ That Never Was: A Study In Media Hysteria, Anti-Muslim Bigotry and Police Abuse.” *World Socialist Web Site*, 25 September 2002. Available from <http://www.rense.com/general29/911oops.htm>. Accessed 3 February 2003.

Stone reported that she and her son were seated in the restaurant adjacent to the three men and overheard them making the following statements in a low volume: "I don't know if that much can bring it down"; and "they mourned September 11th, they are going to mourn September 13th as well." Stone further reported that the three men mentioned they had been partying in Chicago the previous day in celebration of September 11, 2001, and they were five hours behind schedule in their travel to Miami, Florida. As the men left the restaurant, Stone noted that they paid with a credit card and two of the men got into a cream colored Nissan Maxima and the other entered a black newer model Honda, both vehicles displayed Illinois license plates, one of which she was able to record, and were last seen entering Interstate 75 southbound. This summary was the initial information that was reported to law enforcement authorities by Stone.

GISAC immediately began to verify the information that had been provided to authorities and at 11:45 a.m. GISAC called the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to advise them of the conversation with Stone. Computer checks of the tag number came back with no information, the tag was not on file in the national database. GISAC contacted Stone to verify the tag number, which she did. At 2:50 p.m. authorities in Florida were advised by officials with the Illinois Attorney General's Office that their local information revealed that the tag number should be displayed on a 1997 Buick four-door sedan and that the owner was of a Latin surname, Munõz. At 3:30 p.m. Georgia authorities interviewed employees of the Shoney's restaurant, retrieved the credit card information from the transaction of the three men and re-interviewed Eunice Stone. Law enforcement authorities were unable to secure video tapes from Shoney's to corroborate Stone's report. At 5:30 p.m. a lookout, to law enforcement, for the cars and the men was issued, by authorities in Florida. At 6:15 p.m. that same lookout was rebroadcast in Georgia to law enforcement officials only.

At 11:30 p.m. a Collier County, FL deputy sheriff stopped the cream colored vehicle for running through a toll booth eight miles from Interstate 75 on a highway known as Alligator Alley. The black vehicle traveling in tandem pulled over behind the deputy and the cream colored vehicle, and the deputy called for

backup assistance. Within minutes, scores of law enforcement officers arrived on the scene and the scenario that played to a national audience was starting to play out. The manhunt was over, but the investigation and public critique was just beginning.

Before the men were released, an in-depth investigation in at least three states went forward over the next seventeen hours. Following are some of the results of the investigation, some of which gave suspicion to investigators and lent credibility to the belief that the men may have had evil intent. At a minimum some results gave reason to believe that criminal activity may have been afoot. Two separate bomb dog teams alerted on the trunks of both vehicles. While certainly within their constitutional rights, the men refused a consensual search of their vehicles. One of the men made the statement, "you stopped us because of what we said at that restaurant up in Georgia". The first interviews with the men were characterized by police as "uncooperative" and their statements did not corroborate each other.

In the end, there was no evidence that the men were terrorists or that they were engaged in any plot, conspiracy or plan to harm anyone. The conflicting vehicle tag information was investigated and explained, the motel rooms where they stayed were clean, the credit card information checked out with no abnormalities and citizenship and visa information were substantiated. Even the report that one of the cars failed to pay the toll booth was inaccurate, as video footage revealed that both cars did, in fact, pay the tolls and the \$126 dollar ticket had to be voided.

Step back in time to the dates of this incident, September 12-13, 2002. The one-year anniversary of the most devastating terrorist attack against civilians on American soil had the country feeling uneasy about the security of the homeland. For the first time since the development of the color-coded Homeland Security Threat Advisory System, the nation had been placed on an increased level of alert, orange (high) from a yellow (elevated) only a few days earlier. National leaders and the press did not name any specific information that led to

the increase in the threat level but did advise law enforcement agencies to maintain a “heightened state of awareness” although no specific instructions were given on how to meet this expectation. The people were told to go about their business as normal but to “be aware of [their] surroundings” and to “report any unusual activity to local law enforcement authorities.” Many speculated that terrorists might attempt another attack on or near the anniversary of 9/11. The Federal Emergency Management Agency had firmly requested that the state emergency management agencies report to them any events where large gatherings of people were expected to assemble the week prior to the anniversary. Many people were anxious. It was in this environment, that Eunice Stone called the police.

D. LESSONS LEARNED CONCERNING REQUIREMENTS

The first point to make relative to this case study is that the information was developed locally. Although the men were exonerated, they just as easily could have been terrorists planning an attack or individuals on the FBI’s terrorism watch list. The information did not come from spy satellites, telephone intercepts, or a prison cell in Guantanamo Bay, it came from local sources. The Attorney General, the FBI Director and any number of terrorism experts have told us repeatedly that the enemy is here, on our soil, in our country and is living among us. That was certainly the case with the hijackers of 9/11; two had been living in my hometown, Atlanta, Georgia!⁹ Today, with this enemy there will be domestic and foreign sources of information that may need to trigger a warning. Authorities must recognize this fact and reengineer a system to incorporate the invaluable contribution of local inputs.

Secondly, there must be a one-stop-shop to gain the assistance of the federal government for checking the status of people on various federal data bases that are not available to state and local authorities. Prior to the establishment of the federal Department of Homeland Security “nine federal agencies [that] spanned five different cabinet-level departments [maintained]

⁹ Dave Hirschman. “Flight School Owner Rues Day He Saw Terrorists”. *Cox News Service*. 11 September 2002.

twelve terrorists and criminal watch lists.”¹⁰ Currently in Georgia, the GISAC checks all information through the FBI managed Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) located one floor below the offices of GISAC. The JTTF has in residence a myriad of federal agency representatives that have access to their own databases and can check and verify information submitted by GISAC officials.

Additionally, there is a need for states to have a clearinghouse that the federal government or another state can use to avoid lengthy delays in obtaining information. Luckily, in this incident the states that were called upon had offices that “ran interference” in their own state and were able to obtain vehicle and driver information for the agents at GISAC. What would have happened if these states did not have a central point of contact? What would have happened had the case been more complicated and rather than the suspicion of an explosive device there was the suspicion of the intentional poisoning of the food supply, a cyber attack on the power grid, or a biological agent? Would there have been a state point of contact that could have provided the necessary information and contacts required to disrupt the threat in time? The states desperately need Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to accommodate these types of demands for information exchange on a full time basis.

E. REQUIREMENTS TO DEVELOP STATE/LOCAL INTELLIGENCE

In the environment after 9/11 states also must be able to provide their own capability to gather, examine, and investigate information. In the days and weeks after the attacks and the subsequent legitimate and hoax anthrax events in the fall of 2001 most public safety organizations were bombarded with calls reporting every imaginable suspicious scenario. While most of these well intentioned reports by the public were of little value, there were some reports that warranted further investigation and yielded information that was beneficial to public safety officials. In these instances where people called local and state authorities to report suspicious behaviors and circumstances they believed to be

¹⁰ Robert F. Dacey and Randolph Hite. Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reforms, House of Representatives. *Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges and Key Management Issues*. United States General Accounting Office, 8 May 2003. p.34.

indicative of terrorists' plots or the location of members of terrorist cells, federal agencies could not have handled the volume. Not only was the sheer volume a problem but the criticality and reliability of the information was not of the level that most federal law enforcement and intelligence organizations require prior to taking some sort of action.

Further, states should develop the capacity to provide their own policy makers with intelligence to enable them to perform the necessary homeland security duties at that level. As previously mentioned, billions of dollars have been awarded to states to enhance homeland security efforts. Each state has varying threat elements, vulnerabilities and capabilities to respond to an act of terrorism. In the current environment, states must have the capacity to scan the environment and produce intelligence products to policy makers that will facilitate directing resources in an appropriate manner. Additionally, there are special events that take place in a jurisdiction that may or may not attract the support of federal agency intelligence resources. Even if federal resources are engaged, state officials may be prohibited from accessing those intelligence resources due to security clearance restrictions. Also, differences in missions require that the state be able to provide its own intelligence for policy makers for a particular role or event.

In the upcoming G8 Summit to be held in Georgia, the state and federal roles for that event are markedly different. As will be discussed in more detail later in the next chapter the intelligence resources of the federal and state governments have been somewhat combined in an effort to fuse information. Even with this cooperative effort the missions assigned to each level of government and each agency involved require different information and different intelligence. For example, the United States Secret Service is the lead federal agency and is primarily concerned about dignitary protection in a few very finite areas called venues many of which are extremely isolated by the ocean and difficult to maneuver terrain. The state of Georgia, however is concerned that since the venues are virtually inaccessible would be protestors will choose to stage protests in locations far removed from the venues. If this occurs, it is the

problem of state and local governments to manage. Thus, the need for intelligence information to assist in determining if the protestors will choose a different site, whether or not they have a potential for violence and how many there will be. The intelligence requirements for distinct missions are different.

F. CONCLUSION

State and local governments do have a role in the new homeland security intelligence efforts. Hundreds of thousands of eyes and ears in local communities can provide valuable information to the states for statewide intelligence trends and to the federal government for developing regional and national tactical intelligence. The states have a need for strategic intelligence to make wise resource allocation decisions and tactical intelligence to know where the enemy is residing and what plans and capabilities they are amassing. States also need fulltime ISACs to assist other states in investigating fast breaking incidents, like Alligator Alley and to issue warnings to thwart potential attacks. This capability should be robust should the incidents be more complex and involve disciplines other than law enforcement.

The state of Georgia has developed this type of capability. The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center was created shortly after 9/11 and has fulfilled one of the missions previously lacking in our state. From a meeting held the Sunday after 9/11 to the critical role GISAC is playing in preparations for the G8 Summit, the creation, successes and future challenges of GISAC are described in the next chapter.

III. THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER

After 9/11 Public Safety officials in Georgia recognized that terrorists had infiltrated our country and were living, planning and launching attacks against us from our own cities and neighborhoods. These officials immediately predicted the tremendously important role that state and local governments would have to play in the prevention of future terrorist attacks. This chapter will discuss the establishment of a statewide information sharing and analysis function in Georgia and examine key issues addressed that ensured the success of this newly created capability. Several examples will be used, in the form of case studies, to validate certain fundamental principles that were established early on in the development of this newly created unit. Specifically to be examined is the organizational structure of the unit itself and more broadly the reporting structure of the unit to high ranking public safety officials in state government. These initial decisions and founding principles will prove to be essential to the success of this newly established organization. Finally, I will discuss future challenges relating to maintaining the integrity of founding principles and embracing expanded roles like the involvement with the intelligence function in planning for the Group of Eight Summit (G8). Maintaining core values will prove to be critical as success of this new capability is attracting new partners to the arena.

A. CREATION OF GISAC

On October 25, 2001, the state of Georgia launched its effort into the terrorism intelligence arena by establishing the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC). Obviously, the creation of this state level “terrorism intelligence” unit was in direct response to the terrorist attacks that occurred in America on 9/11. This visionary effort was initiated prior to the issuance of any national guidance or strategies suggesting that the states would or should be included in an intelligence or information sharing role within the context of Homeland Security.

The impetus for establishing this unit was the direct result of a meeting conducted on Sunday, September 16, 2001 between a small group of state level law enforcement and emergency management officials at the headquarters of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency in Atlanta, Georgia.¹¹ The purpose of this meeting was to formulate a plan for the state's involvement in the fight against terrorism and to provide to the Governor that plan and a budget for implementation. It is interesting to reflect upon this meeting to examine the initial recommendations made by this small group concerning the needs for the state of Georgia and compare them to the efforts articulated in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. To be sure, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* is a much more comprehensive document than is the plan initiated by the small group that Sunday afternoon but some of the initial conclusions were strikingly similar in the themes that were developed. Recommendations were made to enhance communications and collaboration with the private sector regarding critical infrastructure, employing more planners for tactical level planning to ensure the best possible state response should an act of terrorism occur in Georgia, ensuring that communications systems were sufficient to provide timely warnings, and to "get back into the intelligence business, so we will know what's going on in our own backyard".¹² Even then, arguably that group was addressing four of the six critical mission areas that would be published in July of 2002 in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*; domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, and emergency preparedness and response, and intelligence and warning.¹³ Georgia was about to "get back into the intelligence business" but many things would have to happen before the GISAC would become the critical prevention tool for the State of Georgia that has become.

One such matter occurred on October 25, 2001 when Governor Roy Barnes named the state's first Homeland Security Coordinator, empanelled the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force and created the GISAC and its reporting

¹¹ The meeting referenced was attended by the author.

¹² Remarks cited, with permission, during that Sunday meeting by Vernon Keenan, Director of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.

¹³ *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Washington, D.C.: July 2002. p. viii.

relationship to the Task Force.¹⁴ Here I will discuss the importance of these executive actions and subsequent gubernatorial actions and executive orders that contributed to the success of GISAC. The unique reporting relationship of GISAC to the head of the state homeland security effort and to the members of the Task Force has enabled and facilitated information sharing envious to most communities desirous of intelligence capabilities.

Below we will take a journey through the two and a half years existence of GISAC from the initial decisions regarding the mission of GISAC through the current involvement the unit has in developing intelligence and providing information to policymakers in preparation for the Group of Eight (G8) Summit to be held on Sea Island June 8-10, 2004. Additionally, the necessity to create this unit occurred during the middle of a state budget cycle. How would it be staffed and funded? Where would the GISAC be physically located and what other challenges would lie ahead? Once established the GISAC would achieve some successes and be beneficial to other efforts including the G8 Summit and other high profile events such as meetings of the Free Trade Association of the Americas (FTAA).

B. THE MISSION OF GISAC

It is important to recall the days immediately following 9/11 and how the mood and activities of public safety officials were dominated by this unprecedented event. Because there had been almost no capacity at the state level for terrorism intelligence activities and very little support for even minimal criminal intelligence efforts, officials were seeking a way to not only develop information on terrorists who may be living in their jurisdiction but also to scrutinize the plethora of information that was being received through local, federal and media channels. One specific example that emphasized the need to initiate a state-level unit that would be central to all available terrorism intelligence and to serve as the clearinghouse for which all terrorism information

¹⁴ Maurice Tamman and Duane Stanford, "Barnes Planning Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Center for Georgia," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*. 26 October 2001.

should funnel is a meeting called by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This office serves as the headquarters for all FBI activities in the state of Georgia.

Many public safety officials in Georgia, especially within the non-law enforcement disciplines, enjoy a collegial, inclusive, cooperative relationship with the Atlanta office of the FBI. Prior to and since 9/11 it was commonplace for the FBI to include state and local officials in meetings and workgroups where interagency protocols and plans are developed for various types of responses. Many of these relationships, both organizational and individual, date back to the public safety preparations for the Centennial Olympic Games held in Georgia in 1996.

Within days of the attacks of 9/11 the SAC of the Atlanta Office of the FBI called a meeting with all jurisdictions of local and state law enforcement agencies that comprise the Metropolitan Atlanta Area. The purpose of that meeting was to relay information to that group on the existence of “raw” intelligence information that specified Atlanta as a target of Al Qaeda terrorists. The information was that tall buildings and sports facilities might be the objects of an attack. It was stressed that this information was raw and unverified and that efforts were underway to verify the credibility of the information. It was further communicated that regardless of the security clearance status, or lack thereof, of the local and state law enforcement community; the FBI would pass along information that posed a threat to the population of the City of Atlanta and of the State of Georgia. Two days after that meeting all of the attendees were personally contacted and informed that after thorough investigation the information had not only been determined to be “not credible” but in fact had been fabricated.¹⁵

Despite the excellent relationship that is enjoyed with the FBI in Georgia, common sense dictated that a meeting would not be called every time there was intelligence to be shared and that at some point there would be information that the state did not receive that we thought to be important. Further, the State felt

¹⁵ The author was present at the meeting September 14, 2001, see also: Maurice Tamman, “Terrorist Plot to Hit Atlanta Proves a Hoax,” *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 13 December 2001.

like there may be instances where we had the duty to share information with jurisdictions that were not at the table and would not be able to get the information in a timely manner. Additionally, we highly suspected (and it was later confirmed) that members of Al Qaeda were living and planning in our own backyard. Therefore, we needed to utilize every resource available through state and local governments to develop, analyze, and investigate all information on potential terrorists to deny and interdict their activities. Finally, we understood the limited resources and constraints upon the federal government and the intelligence community and knew that in the future state and local governments would play a vital role in the collection and development of terrorism intelligence. Since terrorists have infiltrated our country and are living among us, those best positioned to gather information are the people working in every local community.

With these assumptions and facts being considered the mission of the GISAC was formed and is articulated in internal documents as follows:

The mission assigned to the GISAC project was to serve as the focal point for the collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism intelligence information relating to Georgia. GISAC was not intended to replace or duplicate the counter-terrorism duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but rather to enhance and facilitate the collection of intelligence information from local and state sources, and to integrate that intelligence information into a system that will benefit homeland security and counter-terrorism programs at all levels.

Soon after it began operations, GISAC established itself as the state's clearinghouse for terrorism-related intelligence information. It quickly developed protocols and relationships that enhanced its capabilities for the gathering, assessment, analysis, exchange, and dissemination of intelligence information between local, state, and federal government agencies; corporate security executives; and the private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure assets.¹⁶

¹⁶ Georgia Homeland Security Task Force. *The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Project*. Atlanta, Georgia, p. 2.

C. STAFFING AND HOW THE MISSION IS ACCOMPLISHED

1. Staffing

Although the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) manages the GISAC five other organizations contribute personnel that fill the seventeen positions at GISAC. And while these are the only full time employees of GISAC numerous state agencies and private businesses provide twenty-four hour points of contact for individuals expert in their field who can provide technical expertise toward the efforts of GISAC. For example, the Division of Public Health provides contacts that facilitate information exchange between epidemiologists and GISAC regarding bio terrorism information and disease surveillance information that may have intelligence value. The Georgia Department of Agriculture provides on call personnel to liaise with GISAC concerning agroterrorism issues. The Georgia Technology Authority assigns network security officers to dialog with GISAC personnel to inform of concerns relating to potential cyber security threats and attacks. This capacity is similar to and is modeled after emergency management organizations that manage recovery efforts through emergency operations centers. Those centers are staffed with personnel from various agencies who are able to commit resources on behalf of their agency toward recovery efforts subsequent to a natural disaster. During non-disaster periods, the same personnel provide planning and training assistance to the emergency management agency in preparation for eventual disasters. Similarly, GISAC counts on “adjunct” personnel or trusted partners. They are not physically present in the office but are available to provide technical assistance, information and coordination within their area of expertise, when needed.

The full time employees of GISAC, their respective assignments and parent agencies are listed below:

Georgia Bureau of Investigation
Inspectors – 1
Special Agents in Charge – 1
Assistant Special Agents in Charge – 1
Intelligence Analysts – 2
Special Agents – 6

Georgia State Patrol
Investigators / Analysts – 1

Georgia Emergency Management Agency
Critical Infrastructure Analysts - 2

Georgia National Guard
Intelligence Analysts – 1

Georgia Sheriff's Association
Investigators/Agents – 1

Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police
Investigators/Agents – 1

2. Reporting and Chain of Command

As mentioned earlier, the GISAC was created on October 24, 2001 simultaneously with the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force and the appointment of the state's Homeland Security Coordinator. There is one additional action, an executive order issued on March 13, 2003 that directly impacts the reporting status of the GISAC. The subject of both executive actions (one an announcement and one a formal executive order) was to establish the framework for how the homeland security efforts were to function in the State of Georgia. Consequently, however, each order effected GISAC; the first of course, more than the second. It is, however, important to understand the political environment and circumstances of both executive orders and their implications upon the chain of command.

Each executive decision was issued by a different Governor as the gubernatorial elections held in November 2002 changed the majority political party in Georgia for the first time in 135 years. Naturally, this change in political power prompted changes in leadership within some agencies of state government. Public safety agencies represented on the Homeland Security Task Force were not exempted from these changes and indeed the person who had previously been the coordinator of the Homeland Security Task Force resigned. Although change was implemented regarding the Homeland Security function, the GISAC model and many of the players remained the same and the mission

has been left intact. The first or enabling executive action was issued under an administration that chose to have a position entitled Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety. The Commissioner was among the highest levels in state government and commanded a large majority of the state's law enforcement resources; many referred to the position as the Supercop. Among the agencies that reported to the Supercop were: the Georgia State Patrol, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, the Capitol Police Services, and various smaller entities. Germane to this subject, however, is that the Supercop was also named as Coordinator of the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force in that first announcement that enabled the creation of GISAC and the Homeland Security Task Force.

The chain of command that was established for the GISAC at its inception was that the unit and its commander reported to the Coordinator of the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force, who at the time was the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety, or Supercop. Even though the commander, at the time, was the rank of Special Agent in Charge (SAC) employed by the GBI the unit was created as an equally subordinate entity to the Coordinator of Homeland Security and the GBI, therefore the SAC reported directly to the Supercop. Had the unit not been established as its own entity this reporting arrangement could not have been implemented as it skipped at least four levels of management within the GBI and would have violated even the most liberal interpretations of chain of command.

Original Reporting Structure of GISAC




Figure 1. Original GISAC Organization Chart

The second gubernatorial action was in the form of an executive order signed March 13, 2003 and was issued by a different governor. This order changed the structure of Homeland Security in Georgia. Even prior to that order, however, the Governor had accepted the resignation of the Homeland Security Coordinator/Supercop and decided to abolish the position of Supercop. Instead, he changed the reporting hierarchy of all state agencies toward a cabinet type of structure comprised of six cabinet positions. One of those cabinet positions is the Director of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security. Currently, except for matters pertaining to Homeland Security, neither the GBI nor any other law enforcement agency report directly to the Director of Homeland Security. The

GISAC, however, does report directly to the Director of Homeland Security and this reporting arrangement was dictated by the second executive order. The Inspector in charge of GISAC still reports directly to the state head of Homeland Security, but it is a different political situation all together. Now, rather than reporting to his boss's boss three levels removed (a very awkward situation), he reports to the head of an entirely different cabinet organization. As it stands today, the entity of GISAC is an asset of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security but it is staffed by individuals employed by other agencies as listed above. Even through political transition a founding principle of GISAC has remained intact; the unit must have unobstructed access to the head of the state's Homeland Security structure.

Reporting Structure of GISAC After Creation of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security




Figure 2. Current GISAC Organization Chart

D. HOW DOES GISAC WORK AND WHAT DO THEY DO?

Consistent with its mission statement the primary role of GISAC is “to serve as the focal point for the collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism intelligence information relating to Georgia.”¹⁷ The mission of GISAC was directly influenced by the many concerns enumerated

¹⁷ Ibid.

earlier in this text. One concern was that many different state and local agencies had to juggle multiple sources of information. These sources of information included organizations in both the public and private sector. Additionally, there existed a fear that meetings previously held for the purpose of disseminating information would be curtailed and the state would miss out on critical information. Further, leaders in the state believed that they had the responsibility to make independent determinations and evaluations regarding terrorist information. Therefore, the state of Georgia decided to *put our flag out* proclaiming, “here is where you deliver information concerning terrorism intelligence” and likewise “if we have anything to tell you about terrorists’ activities, it will be told from here.” In other words, this GISAC is going to be our *one stop shop* for terrorism intelligence. In addition to being the focal point for intelligence in the State of Georgia, GISAC also facilitates collection of intelligence from local law enforcement and non-law enforcement sources, investigates information obtained, analyzes information, makes determinations on information dissemination, and produces certain products for customers.

Upon establishing GISAC it was important for the management to publicize its existence in order to facilitate the collection of information from the vast local sources available in Georgia. Those vast sources and the sheer number of local jurisdictions in the state complicated the effort in spreading the word of GISACs creation and mission. There are 159 counties, over 650 municipalities and 40,000 certified peace officers in Georgia. The sheer volume of potential inputs into GISAC is staggering but is also testimony as to why state and local governments must be involved in the collection of terrorism intelligence information. Over forty thousand eyes and ears in the field; and that is just the certified peace officers not including all of the other government workers serving in those communities who can also be trained to gather information!

Through many associational meetings, personal visits, teletype broadcasts, training conferences and word of mouth the creation of GISAC reached a majority of the organizations that needed to know of its existence. While most of the call volume is handled by the existing staff, overnight reporting

and overflow calls are processed by the call center staffed by the Georgia Emergency Management Agency which is transparent to the caller. On call GISAC staff members are immediately notified of inputs or messages that require urgent attention.

Obviously, one of the primary roles performed by GISAC is to investigate, analyze and make a determination regarding the wide variety of information that is reported. The managers at GISAC are fortunate in that they have been given the authority to task any active GBI agent, in the furtherance of an investigation.¹⁸ This is a critically important capability allowed by the Director of the GBI because of the large geographic area of the state. There are areas of the state that are as much as six hour drives from Atlanta, the headquarters of GISAC. The ability to task GBI agents, assigned to field offices in all areas of the state, ensures timely responses to incidents that require immediate investigative attention. Most information that is reported can be examined, investigated and cleared from the agent's desk in a minimal amount of time, while other cases are extremely complex requiring extensive investigation, analysis and ultimately the issuance of an alert.

An example of a simple yet interesting case occurred shortly after the unit was established. I actually received a call from an official with the Georgia Department of Agriculture who stated his concerns to me regarding an applicant for a vacant food inspector position. The applicant had persistently called inquiring about the status of his application for the position and was extremely interested in securing that particular job. The concern of the manager was that the qualifications of the individual applying were well above the required education level, as he had a Doctor's degree in Chemistry from a University located in a certain Middle Eastern Country. The manager explained to me that the job had been awarded to another more suitable candidate, but the persistence of this particular individual toward a job for which he was incredibly overqualified, had raised suspicions of the candidate's true intent. Because this

¹⁸ Interview with Inspector Bob Hardin, Commander of GISAC, 26 January 2004.

occurred so early on in the establishment of GISAC and all of the agency contact information had not been developed, the manager asked that I forward the information to the appropriate person. This was good information to pass along as the applicant had provided a substantial amount of personal and contact information through his resume. As far as I or anyone associated with GISAC knows, the individual was determined to be *clean* and was not linked to any type of terrorist activity but had there been a law enforcement or federal government interest in this person they now had the information to locate him. The role of the GISAC in this case was merely to document the information, forward the resume to the FBI and ask them to run a check on the person. In this instance the system worked and was an example of a simple flow of information to the appropriate point and a computer check of the individual. Other cases, however, become much more complicated and demonstrate the value of having agencies that do not normally work together being involved in a collaborative effort to develop intelligence.

The involvement of GISAC in case of a Nigerian man attempting to fraudulently purchase vital records is an example of how federal, state and local authorities worked together to identify, collect and develop intelligence information. Additionally, this case was prompted by a “non-traditional” member of the GISAC system; an employee from the state’s Vital Record Section of the Division of Public Health. Through the adjunct staff (or trusted partner), GISAC was notified of an individual that was attempting to order a birth certificate on a child who was deceased. GISAC personnel queried the databases they had access to and requested that their federal contacts do the same to see if the individual who had requested the birth certificate was a fugitive or was on any particular watch list. After the various checks yielded no meaningful information and was negative for the person being on any “wanted list”, GISAC personnel invited federal and local partners to participate in a *controlled delivery* of the requested birth certificate. Therefore, instead of denying the man access to the illegally requested item, the item was delivered to him while law enforcement officials monitored each step of the process. Upon the delivery and receipt of the

birth certificate the man was arrested and his residence searched. Below is an excerpt from the summary of the incident found in the intelligence bulletin prepared by GISAC.

[*The man*] initially claimed to be William Luther Smith and produced a Georgia driver's license, a social security card and an active United States Army Identification supporting his claim. Later, during an interview, [*the man*] admitted that William Luther Smith was not his true identity, but that he was presently active in the United States Army in an Intelligence Unit stationed in Korea under the false identity. [*The man*] stated that he had been in the Nigerian Military. Officers found photographs in the apartment of [*the man*] in his Nigerian Armed Services uniform as well as in a United States Army uniform. [*The man*] was taken into custody on forgery charges.... Officials from the United States Army were notified and are also investigating the incident.¹⁹

Again, this example shows the need to have a system that accommodates information that is obtained locally and by "non traditional" partners. The man did not live in Spain or North Africa; he lived in Georgia. Further, it demonstrates the need to include all levels of government in the intelligence process. In this case the Vital Records Section could have just denied the request; end of story. Instead, the employee passed the information along to someone who could get access to a system that could investigate it further. Then, once the information was gathered and the suspect was arrested the State could have just processed the case like any other case but they did not. They called in the appropriate federal and military authorities to investigate further. Would that have been done five years ago? Probably not. Would any of this have been done five years ago? No, but 9/11 changed the world and it is changing the way people and organizations work together and the participants in the intelligence community.

Whether the investigation is simple or complex GISAC is the agency that processes terrorism related information in the State of Georgia. Therefore, GISAC must determine the appropriate disposition of the information that is processed through the Center. Possible dispositions include further investigation

¹⁹ Georgia Office of Homeland Security. *Intelligence Bulletin*, Issue 21, September 2003. Atlanta, Georgia, p. 1. The original document lists all of the agencies with personnel assigned to GISAC on a full time basis.

and inquiry of the information, attempting to develop the information or lead further, taking no action or filing the information or passing it to the federal authorities. The unique concept of GISAC is that all parties involved in the Center have an opportunity to influence the disposition of the intelligence and the information brought into the Center. Quoting from an internal GISAC document:

After review by GBI supervisors, the 'raw' terrorism intelligence information is forwarded to GISAC's [numerous, multidiscipline] representatives, who review it within the context of their own particular areas of interest and responsibility. The [various] representatives may subsequently recommend certain actions to GISAC supervisors and/or their own agency/organization managers in order to disrupt or prevent possible terrorist attacks, or to mitigate and manage the consequences of an attack.²⁰

It is officially a written part of the concept of operations to ensure that no information is withheld from various disciplines in the center due to agency origin or level of employment. My opinion is that the GEMA representatives have a particularly diligent responsibility in considering the impact of the information. The reason for this belief is that many disciplines and departments are not represented in the Center on a full time basis therefore GEMA must make a determination on their behalf. The other full time employees of GISAC are members of law enforcement agencies or the National Guard, therefore GEMA is expected to represent the interests of all other associated disciplines with regard to the information.

As with all intelligence units the analytical function plays a vitally important role. The GISAC employs analysts who provide various types of analytical support to the agents and customers of the Center. Examples and descriptions of that type of support are as follows:

- **Fusing Information:** Review and merge intelligence information with existing data in the intelligence system so that it may be analyzed.
- **Link Charting:** Establish relationships among entities, individuals or organizations in an investigation.

²⁰ Georgia Homeland Security Task Force. *Information Sharing and Analysis Project*. p. 9.

- **Event Charting:** Show the chronological relationships between persons, organizations, and related events.
- **Flow Charting:** Depict the flow of money, narcotics, weapons, stolen goods or other commodities through the elements of a criminal and/or terrorist network.
- **Activity Charting:** Define the pattern or sequence of a terrorist operation, including modus operandi.
- **Telephone Toll Analysis:** Condense large volumes of data into easy to read automated reports from which the significant telephone activity may be identified.
- **Case Analysis:** Summarize intelligence information, investigative actions taken and the main findings associated with these actions, and the activities of the subjects.
- **Special Publications:** Develop publications on various terrorism intelligence topics. The topics are determined by interest, availability of data and need for the information.²¹

Other products are regularly produced and disseminated by GISAC. The first type of report that was developed and is still in use today is the monthly Law Enforcement Sensitive Report that is distributed to all law enforcement agencies in the state. These reports contain information, which is not classified but should not be distributed to the general public. Additionally, a weekly Open Source Report is provided to the member agencies of GISAC, fire departments and other agencies that have an interest in Homeland Security. This report is very informative as there are plentiful amounts of information obtained through public sources that is valuable to policy makers. The management of GISAC gives an intelligence briefing to the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force at every bi-weekly meeting as well as to the G8 planning group that meets weekly. And of course, when the need arises various alert bulletins are disseminated to organizations and to owners of critical infrastructure. Last, ongoing threat assessments concerning many groups and special events are provided to key leaders who have a need to know for purposes of planning security in and around these special events.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

E. FACILITIES – WHERE IS GISAC?

When GISAC was established there was an immediate need to find office space for the staff. When money is not a problem usually space and many other things are not a problem either. Money was a problem in the early days of GISAC as the entity was created in the middle of the state fiscal year so paying rent was not an option. Luckily, GEMA was able to make available about 2500 square feet of space adjacent to the State Operations Center. This office space was no stranger to some of the special agents assigned the initial GISAC duty as it was the same space utilized by the GBI to command the Intelligence Detail Teams for the Centennial Olympic Games. The space is secure, below grade, and has more than adequate backup power capacity; further, it is adjacent to the main floor of the State Operations Center and the Communications Center for GEMA, which also serves as the state's 24-hour warning point. Because the GBI Intelligence Detail Teams use the room as a command center during every special event of any importance the room had been nicknamed the GBI room. It was only fitting then to establish those rooms as the first headquarters of GISAC, and the price was right too!

After several months of operation it became apparent that more spacious and convenient accommodations were warranted. Although many improvements to the space were made including robust security measures to ensure the integrity of the information and files being kept, GISAC was simply outgrowing the makeshift offices in the underground command center of GEMA. Further, the FBI through the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) had emerged as a key player with GISAC as the state intelligence agency needed a federal partner to *check* information and *run* people on various federal databases. In the current office arrangement at GEMA the trip between the two offices took about 30 minutes, so the face to face interaction that needed to take place in some instances was thwarted by time and distance. Negotiations were initiated between the upper management of the FBI and State Officials concerning some available office space in the office building where the FBI rented their offices. A private company had declared bankruptcy and moved out far short of their lease period and the

FBI had first right of refusal on the property as it was only one floor above the offices of the JTTF. Through much negotiation and bureaucratic challenges on both the state and federal sides of the table a deal was made and the GISAC relocated to the same building as the Atlanta Office of the FBI and the JTTF. The move took about a month to complete but in September 2002 GISAC had a new home and at around 7,700 square feet, it was three times the size of their old home. The move has proven to be a wise decision as managers in both organizations have stated that the close proximity of the two units has fostered a closer and more trusted working relationship between the two.

F. FUNDING

Since the establishment of GISAC occurred and operations commenced late in the second quarter of the state's fiscal year, funding and staffing for the project was a significant concern. Between October 25, 2001 and April 1, 2002, the resources utilized for the unit were taken from the existing budgets of participating agencies. After April 1, 2002, a supplemental appropriation was made available by recommendation of the Governor and approval of the Georgia General Assembly. The supplemental appropriation, however, only covered the cost of nine budgeted positions, the standard regular operating expenses associated with those positions and a one-time allocation of \$500,000 for office build out and equipment costs. Thus, the total continuing state budget for GISAC is the personnel services allocation for seven GBI special agent positions, two analyst positions, two GEMA critical infrastructure planner positions and \$67, 000 for regular operating expenses.²² Therefore, other funding and staffing resources had to be identified in order to operate the unit so that its mission could be fulfilled. In the 2002-2003 fiscal year the unit was awarded a Byrne grant by the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council in the amount of \$400, 000. Had it not been for this grant the move to the FBI building would have not been possible as the majority of this grant is spent on real estate rental. Since that award there has been no additional funding for the GISAC.

²² Office of Planning and Budget. *Governor's Amended Budget FY02*. Atlanta, Georgia.

G. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE LOOK LIKE?

I have examined the meetings, press releases and executive orders involved in the creation of GISAC. We have looked at changes in leadership within the state homeland security structure and the physical moves of the GISAC offices. A few examples of actual cases have been studied, from the simple to the more complex, proving that GISAC works, is needed and is a *player* in the intelligence community as it relates to the state of Georgia. Now what? What lies ahead for GISAC and how will it continue to transform from its roots of “knowing what is going on in our own backyard” and “putting our flag out” to not only maintaining its solid status but handling the increasing demands that are being placed upon it? Below I will discuss three challenges that GISAC is facing as it matures in being the cornerstone of Georgia’s terrorism prevention efforts. The first challenge is of a strategic nature, the second an operational objective and the third is an upcoming event that involves both strategic and operational concerns.

Fundamentally, policy makers must ensure that GISAC is kept central to all terrorism intelligence efforts even as specialized disciplines increase their information sharing efforts within their own communities of practice. Secondly, GISAC must identify a strategy to leverage existing staff to assist in performing investigations when additional field expertise is needed. Situations that could warrant this type of staff expansion include large special security events and for investigating an actual occurrence of terrorism in Georgia. Finally, I will discuss the role of GISAC in the upcoming Group of Eight (G8) Conference that will be held in Georgia, June 8-10, 2004. This will be yet another seminal event for the young organization.

1. Keeping GISAC Central

One of the primary goals in establishing GISAC was to ensure that all terrorism intelligence information with a Georgia implication passes through the Center. Indeed, the GISAC has become our clearinghouse for potential terrorism related information and intelligence. As has been demonstrated, there are many organizations that have information to contribute and must be included in the

collection and evaluation efforts. Since 9/11 and the establishment of GISAC there are many disciplines both governmental and in the private sector, traditional and non traditional, that see the value in sharing information. This is especially true when the information warrants evaluation and analysis the result of which could confirm or dispel a suspicion that an act of terrorism is afoot. As various disciplines and sectors build their own sharing capability it is paramount that dual, or parallel systems, do not evolve. The potential for this scenario to develop occurred in Georgia when the agriculture sector expressed a desire to create an Agricultural Information Sharing and Analysis Center (AgISAC). To the credit of all involved in the processes, a dual system was not created. The point of the example is to show that as GISAC continues to be successful and the movement for information sharing systems/centers among sectors continues to grow, GISAC will have to learn how to accommodate new customers, process more information and demand to stay central to the overall process. Those objectives were accomplished by the role they have played in the development of the AgISAC and the role they will play in its operation.

2. The AgISAC

The entry point into the system is the state's existing twenty-four hour communications center that is utilized as a call center to accept reports of suspected agroterrorism or food safety concerns. This is accomplished by publicizing a toll-free telephone number that is routed to the communications center, which is operated by GEMA. Although there is a toll-free telephone number the GEMA Communications Center also monitors facsimile machines and email emergency notification systems that could be the delivery mechanism for the report. The communications officer takes the report from the party reporting the concerned information. Based upon pre-defined protocols and contact information the communications officer manually notifies the appropriate member of the Executive/Threat Assessment Committee that a report has been initiated. The method of notification is determined by the committee member and whether the contact is made during duty or non-duty hours. Based upon the specificity, urgency and seriousness of the information contained in the report,

the committee member decides the appropriate action to take. The possibilities of actions by the committee member are numerous at this point but, for purposes of explaining the AgISAC, it is important to note two developments new to the system in Georgia. First, because of this initiative, now there are pre-defined protocols that include all of the necessary entities, both public and private, needed to conduct a threat assessment, and secondly, there is a secure method (a secure web portal) in which to discuss the information and make the appropriate notifications.

When the committee member makes the decision, based upon the seriousness and nature of the information included in the report, to enlist the assistance of the other committee members is the point at which the Virtual ISAC technology is employed. The committee member logs into the secure portal that allows the member to post information to a bulletin board and select the desired level of notification needed to complete the threat assessment. The notification will be delivered via the secure portal to the other committee members, by the device they choose, instructing them to log on to the network to discuss the report and determine further appropriate actions. The members of the threat assessment committee represent the **GISAC** (this includes law enforcement and the FBI's InfraGard program), the Georgia Department of Agriculture, and the Georgia Department of Public Health. After discussion in a secure environment, the appropriate disposition is determined and the various agencies conduct the duties required of them by regulation or law. If further notifications are necessary, they are accomplished by predetermined protocols through the secure portal to the appropriate public and/or private entity. If some type of public warning is required that decision is made between the lead agency, GISAC and the Georgia Office of Homeland Security and is performed outside of the secure portal through established public warning procedures and methods.²³

²³ The description of the system is based upon the review of organizational meeting minutes and interviews with Dan Brown, Chief of Communications, GEMA.

The positive results of the decision to explore creating an AgISAC are numerous. Existing resources, like the GEMA Communications Center and the GISAC, are being utilized which is economically and operationally sound. Responsibilities and expectations between the public and private sectors, as well as between governmental agencies not normally accustomed to emergency response operations, were made clear by the development of duties and protocols. The high level, experienced personnel necessary to make appropriate determinations regarding complex issues are being allowed to participate, from anywhere at anytime, on the front line thanks to a technological solution. And ultimately the most positive result is that the public is safer because steps are being taken to ensure that the food supply remains as safe as possible.

As the demand for information sharing and analysis increases to include a myriad of disparate sectors GISAC must remain central to the process. The role it plays in the coordination, awareness and potential fusing of various pieces of information is the fundamental principle of the Center. The evaluation of the information must be performed by the sector specific experts but the fusion and clearinghouse function must be maintained by the GISAC. In the early stages of GISAC this technical function of evaluating sector specific information was achieved solely by the “adjunct” staff members. Now as the sectors are building their capacity for sharing the future will see more sector specific ISACs develop as evidenced by the creation of the AgISAC. The example set with this first “addendum ISAC” must be followed in subsequent ISACs, which will surely be established, in order to prevent dual efforts and creating a disjointed system.

3. Supplemental Staff

Notwithstanding any argument as to whether or not the current staffing level is adequate for their daily mission, without additional staff GISAC cannot adequately function in a special security event or in the event of an act of terrorism in Georgia. As previously mentioned the Agent in Charge of GISAC has the authority to task any agent of the GBI in the furtherance of an investigation suspected to be terrorism related. This is true regarding the collection of information, interviews or other investigatory techniques. The

problem is that this authority is primarily reserved for time sensitive matters when a trained GISAC agent cannot respond in a timely manner to accomplish what needs to be accomplished. Further, these GBI field agents have their own responsibilities and cannot afford to get involved in a lengthy investigation that would compromise the integrity of the cases for which they are responsible. Recognizing the need for a plan to supplement the staff of GISAC with trained law enforcement officers, GBI Director Vernon Keenan formulated a plan that will accomplish that goal.

The Strategic Tactical Antiterrorism Response (STAR) program is the combination of a training program and mutual aid agreement between the GBI and the Multi-jurisdictional Drug Task Forces in Georgia. These task forces are a combination of local and state law enforcement organizations that enforce illegal drug laws in the state. In other words they are undercover drug agents. There are 31 of these task forces and they have an operational area of 92 of the 159 counties in Georgia. There are over 300 sworn, trained officers who work in these units on a full time basis. These individuals are perfectly suited for fulfilling a supplemental staffing role for GISAC in that they are already specially trained for complex investigative work, can work undercover to provide human intelligence when needed and are geographically dispersed throughout the state. Many of the task forces already utilize the GBI's case management system, have access to certain information systems and are familiar with many of the investigative and analytical functions utilized by GISAC described earlier in this paper like the many charting and analysis products.

There is little that remains to be done for the STAR program concept to become a reality. Each officer will attend a specially developed training course taught by the GISAC staff that will, in effect, teach them how to convert their skills in criminal intelligence and investigation to that of terrorist intelligence and investigation. Mutual aid agreements will be signed by law enforcement agencies that have staff assigned to the Multi-jurisdictional Drug Task Forces.

These mutual aid agreements will specify the conditions under which the officers will become agents of GISAC, the use and access to case management systems and data bases, and legal issues involving liability and authority.

4. The 2004 Group of Eight (G8) Conference

In July 2003 President George W. Bush announced that the Group of Eight (G8) Economic Summit will be hosted by the United States of America and is to be held on Sea Island, Georgia, June 8-10, 2004. Subsequent to that announcement the event has been declared a National Security Special Event (NSSE) and the United States Secret Service has been designated lead federal agency status.

It is only prudent to expect some level of protest activity near the location of this event given the recent history of protests at similar gatherings that promote free trade and the extensive media attention given to protest groups seeking publicity for their causes.²⁴ Some of these protests have turned violent requiring the supplemental use of riot squads and other specialized units that mitigate other forms of civil disobedience. While the Secret Service will be the lead agency for securing the Summit on Sea Island, it is imperative that local and state agencies be prepared to respond to collateral activities associated with this event. State and local resources must be prepared should illegal activities occur outside of the declared national security event and its associated venues. While a coordinated effort must be maintained it is important to note there are two very different missions regarding the responsibilities of the Secret Service and local and state authorities. The primary mission of the Secret Service is to protect the dignitaries and ensure that the conference and associated activities are not disrupted. The role of the state is to support the local governments with their primary mission of ensuring public safety. The two missions are not mutually exclusive but are very distinct and are somewhat more delineated due to the geographical setting in which the meeting will take place.

²⁴ Brigitte L. Nacos, 2002. *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p. 72.



Figure 3. Sea Island, Georgia

Sea Island, Georgia is an exclusive, privately owned resort area where ingress and egress can be totally controlled by human and physical security assets. The security concern for this event is not as much for the primary venue

proper as it is for the surrounding areas. The one hundred mile coastal area of Georgia is comprised of six counties that includes three major population centers; Savannah, Brunswick/Sea Island and Saint Mary's/King's Bay, each about fifty miles apart with Brunswick/Sea Island area in the center. The remaining area is rural. Government public safety services in this area, with the exception of Savannah, are modest to sparse especially considering an event of this magnitude. Because the federal responsibilities for this event are to secure the various meeting and activity venues, local and state public safety resources are responsible for all areas outside of the venues. Other than Sea Island itself venues are finite places where meetings and activities will be conducted. A hotel, for example, might be a venue; however the roads and public access leading to the venue is not part of the venue. Hence, federal resources will protect the venues, state and local resources must protect the surrounding areas. Therefore, information and intelligence concerning this event and any protest groups planning to attend the meeting is of paramount importance.

Because the state of Georgia had established its information sharing link to the federal agencies nearly two years earlier, with the creation of GISAC, an integrated intelligence operation was almost instantaneously began upon the announcement that G8 would be held in Georgia. Information is being shared pre event and an integrated Intelligence Operation Center will be operated during the event. Below is an example of how the coordinated efforts of local, state and federal resources are being utilized to gather information and possibly thwart the planning and information gathering efforts of those who might be intent upon disrupting the Summit.

"On December 23, 2003 ... GISAC received notification from the Glynn County Police Department... regarding a traffic stop investigation on Saint Simon's Island." (Saint Simons Island is adjacent to Sea Island, the location for the upcoming G8 Summit.) The individuals in the vehicle were thought, by the police, "to have been taking photographs of various locations around the island." Subsequent to the vehicle stop officers obtained consent to search the vehicle and found

numerous electronic items, such as scanners, cameras, and video transmission equipment. During interviews with Glynn County authorities, [the suspect], a Swiss national, claimed he was the grandson of the owners of Reuter's News Agency and was in the U.S. to cover the G8 Summit. Also, during the interviews, [the suspect] stated he had been on Fort Stewart in Hinesville, GA interviewing several soldiers. The Public Information Officer for the base confirmed this information.

There was another individual in the vehicle with the suspect who had identification showing him to be a resident of Hinesville, GA, the location of Fort Stewart. "Intelligence checks on both subjects were negative and the subjects were released after they were questioned."

On January 1, 2004, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and GISAC learned that [the suspect] had approached two Plant Hatch Nuclear Facility security guards on their way to work earlier that date and asked numerous questions about the nuclear facility. He requested to do a story on the security of the facility. The guards refused to give him any information but obtained his name from the identification and other paperwork he presented to them. On January 2, 2004, law enforcement authorities were informed by Reuter's News Service [the suspect] was in no way connected to their company, nor was he related to the founder of Reuter's News Agency.

On January 3, 2004, FBI agents interviewed the suspect and he again claimed to be a reporter completing "ground work for a story on the G8 Summit." He was released after the interview. The next day the suspect was confronted by yet another local police agency for being illegally parked at a restaurant. The suspect was taken into custody, fingerprinted and released. As a result of the fingerprints being obtained the FBI was able to complete a criminal history check which revealed that the suspect was using a false name and had been convicted of a felony in Miami, FL. Further investigation revealed that he had provided false information on his visa application. "On January 19, 2004, [the suspect] was arrested by the FBI in Newport News, VA on federal charges of visa fraud...and is facing possible deportation."²⁵

²⁵ The information in this case study was taken from interviews with members of GISAC and the quotations are directly from the Office of Homeland Security. *Intelligence Bulletin*, Issue 25, Atlanta, Georgi, January 2004, p. 1.

Without the integrated effort of local, state, private sector and federal officials this type investigation could not have occurred. Information, like this, will allow intelligence officials to see trends, predict future activities and determine if sinister plots are in the planning stages. Further, intelligence analysts can establish links between local individuals that may be sympathetic to groups who might seek to cause disruptions during the Summit. All information of this type contributes to the ability of public safety organizations to adequately prepare for and provide a safe event for the dignitaries as well as the citizens who live in the immediate area. Just like there are areas of responsibility for providing security, there are areas of responsibility for providing information and intelligence. This case shows that there is indeed a role for all levels of government and the private sector for information sharing and intelligence.

The role of Intelligence is to provide policy makers with the information they need to make decisions.²⁶ As mentioned earlier, the operation necessary to support this NSSE has multiple policy makers with different roles in the event. Each organization needs accurate, timely information analyzed with their mission considered so that sound policy decisions can be made regarding their mission. In the above case study, one only has to remove any one of the contributors to create a potential intelligence failure. Neither our dedicated public safety officials nor our country needs another Intelligence failure. In this example of harmonious coordination and cooperation each entity demonstrated a key role in contributing to the identification of this suspect resulting in his eventual capture. The intelligence value of this success, while significant now, will not be fully known until subsequent investigations are completed and until after the Summit has concluded. Each entity not only has a contribution to play in the intelligence operation of a NSSE but also has requirements they need filled by the intelligence community and therefore must be allowed to be a part of the coordinated effort.

²⁶ Mark Lowenthal, 2003. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2nd ed. CQ Press, Washington, D.C. p. 2.

Fortunately, that has been the case in Georgia concerning the intelligence function for G8. GISAC has been involved with the FBI and the Secret Service each step of the way. GISAC was included from the beginning as the Secret Service established the Intelligence Sub Committee and named GISAC as a co-chair of the committee. Accordingly, rather than operating independently there will be a fusion center or combined intelligence operations center *inclusive of all agencies* when staffs are moved forward to work the event. This integrated Intelligence Operations Center will be located in a secure area of the larger Multi-agency Coordination Center, a place where all parties will be commanding their forces.

H. SUMMARY

Only weeks after 9/11, in a visionary move, the state of Georgia created GISAC to be the central processing and collection point for all its terrorism related intelligence information. Public safety leaders knew that the enemy had infiltrated our country and “we needed to know what was going on in our own backyard.” In the years since being established there are now obvious reasons accounting for its success.

Positive, collegial relationships were maintained and established with state, local and federal entities that had a stake in the mission of providing and sharing information. These relationships have proven to be central to the success of GISAC as evidenced by the various agencies that have permanently assigned personnel to the Center, the facilities that have been made available for its use and the intelligence successes demonstrated by an examination of the case studies. Another key to success is that the GISAC reports to the head of the state’s homeland security effort. The placement within the organizational structure of state government has survived a major transition of political power within the state. This stability and high position within the organizational chart of state government evidences the importance placed upon the GISAC and the state’s commitment to the unit and to the concept of information sharing.

The future of GISAC is filled with opportunities to grow and become more effective. These opportunities must be managed appropriately with the founding doctrines maintained. Accordingly, as new sector specific ISACs are established GISAC must remain central to the coordination of all activities. This coordination has been maintained and a template has been established with the creation of the Georgia AgISAC. Centrality of coordination efforts are easy to demand when the history of GISAC's operational behavior and its own policies require the sharing of information to all pertinent entities, both traditional and nontraditional. This enables organizations to make determinations concerning distribution of intelligence to their constituencies, or in other words, they are partners in deciding "who needs to know".

The future for GISAC will also have it playing a major role in the preparation and planning for special events. One such event is the upcoming G8 Summit that will be held in Georgia in June 2004. Already GISAC has been a key component to the intelligence efforts for this high profile event. Even though the event has been declared a NSSE and the Secret Service is the lead federal agency, GISAC has been central to the intelligence planning and operations. Already suspicious activities concerning the Summit has been reported through the GISAC system and in one particular case an individual has been arrested and is facing deportation for fraudulent information given on his visa. The model of fusing information between federal, state, local and private sector resources prior to an event will be field deployed and utilized during this event by establishing a joint intelligence operations center near the site of the Summit.

GISAC is central to the terrorism prevention efforts of the state of Georgia. The success that it has enjoyed is the result of innovation, the initial political support given and maintained, and sound organizational doctrines. These principles must be maintained to ensure future successes for not only GISAC but for our country in its war on terrorism. Our country does not need another Intelligence failure and we must do everything in our power to keep that from occurring again. The contribution of state and local efforts to the intelligence

community is a huge step in preventing those potential future failures. While the inclusion of these efforts will not guarantee another failure from occurring their exclusion from the effort will most probably guarantee that it will.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis is to show that state and local governments have a key role to play in the intelligence community and that inclusion is mutually beneficial to all levels of government. While proving that hypothesis is not extremely difficult (nowadays) the proof would be useless without a solution. The other reasons for this thesis are to offer solutions. Those solutions include the requirements analysis of a successful state intelligence effort and the important organizational concepts for establishing a state ISAC.

While there are both domestic and internationally based terrorist groups who have successfully committed acts of terrorism in the United States, the events of 9/11 have changed many things about life in America. One of those changes is the requirement that government leaders have accurate and timely intelligence information. Without the inclusion of state and local efforts in the intelligence community that requirement will not be met. For it is in the local communities that the terrorists are living, preparing and planning for their next attack.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, seemed to initiate the United States into the full horrors of international terrorism. Yet the country is no stranger to terrorism. Since 1950 there have been over 3000 terrorist attacks, ranging from the Ku Klux Klan's campaign of terror against the civil rights movement, through the waves of attacks by neo-Nazi and militia groups to the activities of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.²⁷

The supporting research and case studies throughout this thesis show the need to include local and state intelligence efforts is mutually beneficial to all levels of government. Whether the information benefits the military by exposing someone with dual credentials or the Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement by discovering illegal visitors attempting to obtain information about the G8 Summit, locally produced information benefits all involved. When states

²⁷ Christopher Hewitt. *Understanding Terrorism in America*. Routledge, 2003. Introductory Page.

develop single points of contact for the analysis and sharing of information, intelligence can be passed along to federal authorities who can “connect the dots” with similar efforts from other states’ to ensure that the information and intelligence does not stop at the state line. This is truly a federal system, comprised of all of the states, versus a national system. This state-included federal system will add hundreds of thousands of eyes and ears in the field to detect terrorists living in our hometowns.

While the states contribute significantly to the established intelligence community by passing “up” bits and pieces of information from hundreds of thousands of local officials to form tactical level intelligence. States and local governments benefit from the intelligence community by the strategic level intelligence that is passed “down” regarding the capacity of especially foreign based organizations. Local and state governments do not have foreign spies, special military units, or satellites to provide them intelligence of that nature. They must rely on the assets of the federal government to provide that type of information. That information is very important, however, as state policy makers have significant decisions to make in committing precious prevention and preparedness funds. Those decisions must be made with the most robust information available about the enemy(s). Why prepare for a specific type of attack if your enemy does not possess that capability? Conversely, one had better prepare for the attack that your enemy is capable of initiating and one had better know that capability exists. Strategic intelligence is necessary for state and local policy makers.

The state of Georgia quickly and aggressively embraced the challenges presented by the horrific attacks of 9/11 and the realization that the intelligence community had failed. Public safety officials understood that part of the remedy for that failure was to develop and add state level intelligence efforts to the existing intelligence community. The omission of state and local efforts occurred a generation earlier when the intelligence community in America was created but now was the time to change that omission. These attacks and the ensuing political reaction indicated that the strategy of using terrorism in the homeland

had reached a new level. The enemy seemed more organized, more capable and more resolute. Prior to receiving national guidance and before the publishing of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* public safety leaders in Georgia established the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center. Initially the reason was obvious; foreign terrorists had infiltrated our country, were living in our communities and it was the responsibility of those in local and state government to do their part in locating them and preventing future attacks. While the attacks of 9/11 and the impact of international terrorists were the impetus for the creation of GISAC this newly formed unit would be effective in fighting domestic terrorists as well.

GISAC was formed on October 21, 2001 and was housed in the same building as the state's emergency operations center. Immediately, the newly created unit began investigating and developing information on activities and individuals that may possibly be involved in terrorism. Crucial to the success of any effort of this type was the need to establish a relationship, or link, to the federal intelligence community. This was done by approaching the FBI through the Joint Terrorism Task Force located in Atlanta, Georgia. Investigators with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation led the effort to create GISAC and had a working relationship with the FBI through works of mutual interest in the criminal investigation arena.

From the first days of its existence, GISAC began investigating leads and developing information on potential domestic and international terrorist activities in and around the state of Georgia. Those investigations have ranged from merely performing rumor control activities and passing "up" information that no one will ever know whether or not the information made a difference (like the call from the Georgia Department of Agriculture regarding an over anxious, over qualified Middle Eastern job applicant), to people who were deported due to fictitious travel visas. Regardless of the outcome of the investigations performed, GISAC has remained central to Georgia's prevention efforts. Through those efforts many lessons have been learned about what is important for state information and sharing efforts.

The Alligator Alley case study revealed that almost all information originates locally. Further, a lesson learned is that all states need to develop a central point of contact to facilitate the gathering of information in a terrorism investigation. Events and situations develop and move quickly and states need to have a unit of government (preferably an ISAC) to navigate their own state's bureaucracy on behalf of the state requesting investigative or antiterrorism information. Again, relationships are very important in this type of work and must be established to ensure that information flows properly. Additionally, states need to have a single point of contact in the federal system to navigate that bureaucracy and to check suspects against various databases and watch lists. The final point that Alligator Alley showed is that the state ISAC must be broader than just law enforcement. This case study was extended somewhat and included some "what if" questions. The answers to those questions and the policies in place at GISAC substantiate the need for numerous subject matter experts and critical facility representatives included as staff members, "trusted partners", or adjunct staff to the ISAC. In today's environment law enforcement alone cannot possess the breadth of knowledge it takes to analyze all information and make accurate threat assessments on the myriad threats that exist. The list of expertise needed is voluminous but a few examples are biological, cyber, agricultural, radiological and the various critical infrastructure sectors.

Finally, an examination of the case studies and the lessons learned during GISAC's two and one half years in operation has revealed some fundamental principles that should be considered by other states following this model. First, the non-law enforcement staff members must have access to all information in order to render threat assessments upon that information. Only those expert in their field can make a credible determination relative to their discipline or their sector of critical infrastructure. Second, the agent in charge (or head) of the ISAC must have unobstructed access to the head of that jurisdiction's Homeland Security top official. There are many reasons for this access but none greater than the potential necessity to issue an alert or warning relative to intelligence information. Third, as success occurs and others are want to develop their own

ISAC (developing sector specific ISACs is consistent with the National Strategy for Homeland Security) the state level ISAC must remain as the central, or main, hub of all intelligence information for that state regardless of the discipline or sector. Forth, the ISAC must generate intelligence products for customers to include local and state public safety policy makers so that policy makers have the information they need to make sound funding, operational and preparedness decisions. GISAC publishes weekly and monthly, classified and non classified reports that are distributed to various constituencies. Additionally, they have developed robust investigative and analysis support tools to assist customers with terrorism related investigations and developing intelligence. Finally, to ensure success in information sharing, analysis and investigations and ISAC must have a plan to expand its staff quickly to meet the challenges faced today. GISAC has two ways in which to expand its staff. First, the management of the unit has the authority, given by the Director of the GBI, to task any GBI agent in the state in the furtherance of developing intelligence information or during a terrorism related investigation. This authority is especially critical given the statewide jurisdiction of GISAC and that all employees are assigned to a central office. Often, quickly developing information is reported by local authorities located hours away from GISAC offices. In these circumstances, a locally assigned GBI agent is dispatched to the scene to conduct an interview or otherwise assist with an investigation and the information is forwarded to GISAC. Secondly, GISAC and the GBI are developing a program called STAR (Strategic Tactical Antiterrorism Response) to increase further the numbers of supplemental staff available for state intelligence investigations. This program will ensure that sufficient numbers of specifically trained investigators can be dispatched in a terrorism related investigation as adjuncts to the full time GISAC.

The intelligence community was created a generation prior to 9/11 and was primarily designed to ensure that the United States was not the victim of a surprise attack or an attack with an unanticipated weapon. Sure, there were other capabilities and objectives of the intelligence community but that was its foundation. Through the years the environment has changed and as domestic

and foreign terrorists, who would harm America, grew in numbers and capability the intelligence community did not adapt. There may have been valid and credible reasons for not changing the system but now that must change. In order to increase the chances of preventing future attacks, with either domestic or internationally based groups, state and local law enforcement must be allowed ingress and egress into the intelligence community. Although many attacks have occurred before 9/11 the attacks on that day have been the most tragic to thus far. The time is right to make a major change in the system. The change that needs to be made is to reengineer the intelligence community to include state and local governments as a full partner in the fight against terrorism at home.

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